## 7. Verdict - **Malicious** – The file is a **packer‑wrapped Windows trojan** that contacts a known malicious C2 server and installs a persistent payload. - **Recommended actions:** 1. Block `gdtot.sbs` and `185.53.179.12` at
# Investigation Report – File 1404814641
# Look for URLs grep -Eo '(http|https)://[a-zA-Z0-9./?=_-]+' strings.txt | sort -u Only perform this in the sandbox you set up in § 3. | Observation | How to capture | |-------------|----------------| | Process creation tree | Windows Sysinternals Process Monitor (ProcMon) or Linux strace / auditd . | | Network traffic | Wireshark, tcpdump , or the sandbox’s built‑in network view. Look for DNS queries, HTTP(S) POSTs, or connections to known C2 domains. | | File system changes | ProcMon (Windows) or inotifywait (Linux). Note creation of new executables, scheduled tasks, registry autoruns, or startup shortcuts. | | Registry modifications | ProcMon (filter Reg* ) or a dedicated registry snapshot tool. | | Memory dumping | Use Volatility or the sandbox’s memory capture feature; later run malfind , yarascan , etc. | | Screenshots / UI | Some sandboxes (Any.Run) record a video of the session. Useful for ransomware that displays ransom notes. |
## 1. Overview - **Source URL:** https://new1.gdtot.sbs/file/1404814641 - **Date collected:** 2026‑04‑17 - **Initial impression:** Hosted on a domain frequently used for “one‑click” downloads. https- new1.gdtot.sbs file 1404814641
## 5. Dynamic Analysis (Cuckoo Sandbox) | Observation | Detail | |-------------|--------| | Process tree | `unknown_file.exe` → `rundll32.exe` → `svchost.exe` (renamed) | | Network | DNS query for `s3s9k7.xyz`; HTTP GET to `185.53.179.12/payload.bin` | | Persistence | Created `HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\svchost` | | File system | Dropped `C:\Users\<user>\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\svchost.exe` | | Payload | The downloaded `payload.bin` is a second-stage PE (SHA‑256 `d4e5f6…`) flagged by VT as **Trojan.Win32.Generic**. |
## 4. Static Analysis - **File type:** `PE32 executable (GUI) Intel 80386, for MS Windows` (identified by `file` command) - **Strings highlights:** - `http://185.53.179.12/loader.exe` - `C:\Windows\Temp\svchost.exe` - `RegOpenKeyExA` `CreateProcessA` - **PE imports:** `urlmon.dll`, `wininet.dll`, `kernel32.dll`, `advapi32.dll` - **Embedded resources:** One compressed PE (`UPX0`) – suggests UPX packing.
## 6. OSINT Correlation - **Domain `gdtot.sbs`** appears in 42 recent VT submissions, 35 of which are classified as **Malware** (mostly ransomware droppers). - **IP `185.53.179.12`** listed on AbuseIPDB with 1,218 reports for “malware distribution”. - **File ID `1404814641`** referenced on a 4chan thread discussing “new .exe drops from GDTOT”. Block `gdtot
# Extract strings, limit to printable ASCII > 4 chars strings -a -n 5 unknown_file > strings.txt
## 2. Metadata | Property | Value | |----------|-------| | Domain reputation | Blacklisted on URLhaus (malware distribution) | | SSL cert issuer | Let’s Encrypt (valid until 2026‑07‑01) | | File ID timestamp | 2014‑09‑23 09:47:21 UTC (possible upload date) |
*All hashes searched on VirusTotal – **no matches**.* Look for DNS queries, HTTP(S) POSTs, or connections
The aim is to assess the file’s provenance, safety, and content actually distributing or reproducing the file itself. 1. Collect the basics (metadata you can gather without downloading) | Item | How to obtain | Why it matters | |------|----------------|----------------| | Full URL | Copy the exact link (including protocol, sub‑domain, path, and any query string). | Shows the hosting service ( gdtot.sbs ) – a domain that frequently appears in file‑sharing / “link‑generator” ecosystems. | | Domain reputation | Use tools like VirusTotal Domain Report , URLhaus , or Talos Intelligence to see if the domain has been flagged for phishing, malware distribution, or other abuse. | Helps you decide whether the site is broadly considered malicious. | | Timestamp | Look at the HTTP Date header (if you do a HEAD request) or at the “last‑modified” field if present. | Gives a rough idea of how fresh the file is; older files are more likely to have been re‑used in campaigns. | | File identifier | The numeric string 1404814641 may be an internal ID or a timestamp (Unix epoch = 2014‑09‑23 09:47:21 UTC). | If it’s a timestamp, it can hint at when the file was first uploaded. | | SSL certificate | Click the lock icon in the browser or run openssl s_client -connect new1.gdtot.sbs:443 -servername new1.gdtot.sbs . | Confirms the site uses a valid TLS cert (often a free Let’s Encrypt cert) – not a guarantee of safety but helps rule out obvious MITM setups. | Tip: Keep a simple spreadsheet (or a markdown table) of these observations for each file you examine. It makes pattern‑recognition much easier later on. 2. Obtain a hash without executing the file If you can download the file safely (see § 3 for sandbox options), compute its cryptographic digests:
# Identify file type file unknown_file
